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Dangerous ontologies: the ethos of survival
and ethical theorizing in International
Relations
L O U I Z A  O DYS S E O S 1
Abstract. The article responds to a recent call for a more systematic interrogation of the
persistence of the dichotomous relation between ethics and International Relations. The
addition of ethics into International Relations, it has recently been claimed, has left
unquestioned the ethical assumptions encompassed in the ‘agenda’ of International Relations
itself. Thus, the article examines the ethics implicit in the ‘agenda of IR’ and, in so doing,
considers the condition of possibility for a movement beyond the dichotomy ‘ethics and IR’
and towards ‘an ethical International Relations’. To achieve this task the article calls for an
understanding of ethics as ethos. It further illustrates how the ‘dangerous ontology’ of realist
IR is discursively created through an exposition of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan and Carl
Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political. In this anarchical ontology of danger an ‘ethos of
survival’ has come to be the relational framework through which the other is conceptually
encountered as an enemy. Subsequently, the article considers what repercussions this ethos has
for the reception of ethics into IR.
‘We think restlessly within familiar frameworks to avoid thought about how our thinking is
framed’.2
The discipline of International Relations (IR) has recently witnessed an incitement
to ethical discourse. This incitement can be attributed, at least in part, to the end of
the Cold War which has left the discipline devoid of the structural certainties by
which actions were deemed appropriate in the past. Within this new international
context, moreover, IR scholars increasingly attempt to understand the motivations
underlying state action where no direct link to the ‘national interest’ can be made, as
is sometimes the case, for example, with external intervention in conflicts. Similarly,
catastrophes such as the genocide in Rwanda compel IR ethicists to understand the
inaction by states in the ‘international system’ in the face of what are termed
humanitarian crises.3 Finally, current interest in ethical theories within IR is also
sometimes motivated by the need to effect a change in the meaning and intention of
‘ethics’, or, in a similar vein, as a response to a perceived change in the meaning of
the term. Recently, such a need to effect a change in the meaning of ‘ethics’ has
arisen with the realization that ethics and IR are still understood in a dichotomous
manner.4 The separateness, in other words, of ethics from ‘international’ concerns is
now seen as problematic and has brought about an eagerness among scholars of
ethics in IR to examine what factors might have sustained it. It is within this latter
context that the present article is situated.
In particular, this article examines the ways in which ethics appears as an additive,
as an arguably necessary, but lacking, ingredient in IR. For, as Millennium’s editors
explained in their introduction to the Special Issue on ethics, simply ‘[b]ringing in
ethics as a new agenda item for consideration does not help us to understand the
ethical questions that are in-built in the agenda itself ’.5 What follows below, then,
amounts to an interrogation of the ethics of the ‘agenda of IR’ and a subsequent
consideration of the condition of possibility for moving beyond the dichotomy of
‘ethics and IR’, and towards ‘an ethical international relations’. Such an examination
of the ethics of the ‘agenda of IR’ requires, in the first instance, an investigation of
ontology or ground of the perspective which has historically dominated the
discipline, namely, realism. For, it is from this ontology or ground that the ‘agenda
of IR’ arises.
Furthermore, such an examination must also be concurrent with thinking of
ethics as ethos,6 which this article understands as an attitude and mode of relating
to others. It is only by thinking of ethics as ethos that the operation of a particular
relationality to the other within the ontology of political realism is revealed.7
Specifically, the article argues that in realism there occurs a ‘specific framing of the
relationship of self/other as self/enemy’,8 that is, that the other is related to as an
‘enemy’. Moreover, if we think of ethics as ethos, then the ‘ethics’ of the agenda of
political realism can be seen as an ‘ethos of survival’. Importantly, it is this framing
of ‘other-as-enemy’ in political realism which also leads to a parallel framing of the
relationship between IR and ethics, that is, a framing which reflects IR as the self
and ethics as the enemy of IR. Thus, it can be shown that the realist ground on
which some IR theories rest, and the ethos of survival that it generates, is largely
accountable for sustaining the separateness of ethics and IR and it is its persistent
questioning that might lead us to ‘ethical theorizing’.
The discursive creation of the ontology of danger
The pervasive realist ontology of the anarchic world—out there—must receive
systematic consideration as to the relational schema, or ethos of relating to the other,
which it generates and perpetuates. As a staple of realist theorizing and analysis, the
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notion that ‘anarchy’ is constitutive of academic IR is not new.9 For example,
Brian C. Schmidt writes in his study The Political Discourse of Anarchy that:
From an early point in the history of academic international relations, scholars embraced the
view that the topics of central concern to the field—topics that included the study of the
factors leading to war and peace, international law, international organization, colonial
administration, and the means of achieving world order reform—were grounded in an
ontology of anarchy. The idea that international relations was characterized both by the
presence and absence of sovereignty has provided the intellectual paradigm within which the
academic discourse of international relations has taken place.10
After a thorough investigation of the discursive history of ‘anarchy’ as the consti-
tutive idea of academic IR, Schmidt concludes that ‘the concept of anarchy is more
a function of internal disciplinary debate than a self-referential empirical fact of the
world’.11 However valuable such a conclusion may be, what is imperative for ethical
theorizing within the discipline of IR is not only an affirmation that anarchy is
constitutive of IR. Rather, what is necessary is an investigation as to how this consti-
tutive idea provides the relational schema through which IR, historically dominated
by the realist perspective, theorizes encounters with and, more generally, coexistence
with others. For the purposes of our analysis, a relational schema is the mode of
relating to the other, a schema through which we conceptually encounter the other.
The conceptual framework through which one perceives and comprehends the
encounter with the other is what shapes how real encounters are expected to unfold.
What follows, then, is a discussion of the creation of the dangerous ontology
within which realist IR operates. This ontology can be traced to Thomas Hobbes’s
political philosophy, not in an attempt to claim Hobbes as a progenitor of the
discipline of IR, but as a political philosopher who has provided the ground for
anarchy. Stuart Umphrey argues, in this regard, that ‘[Hobbes’s] teaching…remains
to be overcome in fact. Our way of regarding things political is still predominantly
Hobbesian.’12 Mary Dietz, a prominent Hobbes scholar, concurs when she writes
that, ‘[Hobbes’s] political theory … is at least partly constitutive of the ways in
which we continue to understand and describe our own political practices.’13 The
Hobbesian description of the world as pre-socially dangerous has assumed immense
significance in International Relations by providing the ground for the perspective of
political realism, and this importance has long been recognized within the
discipline.14 What is still missing, however, is a recognition that Hobbes has also
provided an ‘ethos of survival’ through which the other is encountered. This,
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however, can only be discerned if one seeks to understand ethics as ethos, as an
attitude of relating to others. In this vein, it can be argued that for those operating
within an ontology of danger, not only ‘things political’ but also ‘things relational or
ethical’ are uniquely Hobbesian. However, that Hobbes offers just such a schema of
relating to other, one that shapes the way responsibility is understood as something
pertaining to the survival of the self, both in the state of nature and in the sub-
sequent ‘anarchic international realm’, is not widely recognized in IR scholarship.15
Rather, Hobbes’s name is often invoked when the task at hand is to establish what R.
John Vincent called the discipline’s ‘legacy’,16 without a thorough investigation of
how the dangerous ontology, that forms an integral part of any such ‘legacy’, is
created. It is to this task which the article now turns.
‘The other’ as enemy: justifying the scare quotes
The discursive creation of the Hobbesian ontology achieves its ‘dangerous status’ by
linking danger and subjectivity; in other words, in Leviathan danger is grounded in
man’s nature. The text was written in the historical context of the chaotic political
and social situation that the revolutionary climate of the 1650s brought about in
England. Responding to this context, Hobbes provided a description of pre-state
social existence as ‘a state of nature’, where people are enmeshed in a ‘war of all
against all’. Perhaps with an eye to advocate against such a political situation, he
theorized the transcendence of the state of nature towards orderly coexistence
through a Covenant. The Hobbesian solution to the posited dangerous ontology of
‘the state of nature’ created a fragile peace within a ‘commonwealth’. Maintenance
of this peace required the vigilance of a state apparatus, the Leviathan. This man-
made covenant, by which order is brought about, is a product of man’s reason and,
as such, resisted any continuity with the medieval understanding of covenants as
contracted between the people and a godly or princely sovereign. In Hobbes, the
social contract is brought into being solely through man’s action and, therefore, is
radically individualist in its conception. The social contract has undoubtedly
provided political thought with a powerful and lasting imaginary that inseparably
links danger, government, and subjectivity.
Transcendence of the state of nature is only possible due to man’s ‘flash of
reason’, by which Hobbes meant man’s ability to ‘recognize as the real enemy not the
rival, but ‘‘that terrible enemy of nature, death” ’.17 Hence, man self-interestedly
chooses to transcend the dangerous state of nature by abandoning the multiplicity
of wills present among the people at large. Relegating responsibility for survival to
the Leviathan was the only means of temporally and spatially transcending the state
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of nature, in which all persons were enemies to others. In the state of nature the
enemy is omnipresent (‘all against all’) by definition. ‘Whatsoever therefore is con-
sequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is
consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security than what their own
strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall’.18 It is this conception
of the other-as-enemy which makes the notion of an-archy ‘dangerous’ and estab-
lishes survival as the predominant preoccupation of the subject in the state of nature.
The other-as-enemy construct affects how the state of nature is theorized and,
furthermore, where the state of nature is grounded. The enemy is omnipresent
because the causes of war are to be found in man’s nature. Hobbes writes in this
respect, ‘that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First,
Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.’ It is important to elaborate that
Hobbes does not identify the state of nature in actual fighting and enmity. Rather, he
explains that, ‘…the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the
known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary’.19
The universal disposition to quarrel arises from the equality of men:
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee
found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or quicker of mind then [sic] another;
yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so
considerable, as that one man can claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not
pretend, as well as he.20
Equality, in this regard, leads to similar desires about the material goods or glory
‘which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy’. For this being impossible, men who
desire the same thing ‘become enemies; and in the way to their End….endeavour to
destroy, or subdue one an other’.21 Yet, in addition to the competition for material
goods, the Hobbesian subject comes to desire power in itself. John McCumber argues
that the materialist desire for specific objects, which distinguishes the Hobbesian
subject, is supplemented ‘with the general desire for power’.22 When Hobbes
suggests that there is in mankind ‘a generall inclination…a perpetuall, and restlesse
desire for Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death’,23 he thereby transforms
power from being ‘the universal means to satisfying desires into a universal object of
desire on its own account’.24 It is this transformation which delivers the subject to
the state of nature and to an understanding of the enemy as the other person in
competition for power, as well as material goods.
Moreover, man’s ability to transcend his ‘inclination to quarrel’ becomes possible
by another attribute of Hobbesian subjectivity, namely, Hobbes’s distinction between
‘danger’ and ‘sin’. When man is described as evil this means ‘dangerous’; it should be
understood not as theological evil but, rather, as ‘the innocent evil of the beasts’.25
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Man’s troublesome nature is, furthermore, compounded by the structure of the state
of nature, namely, the absence of a common civil power. Prior to the laying down of
his rights by agreeing to the covenant, man is at liberty to do as he pleases. There are
no limits to his rights and liberties. He is ‘dangerous’ because of his quest for power,
yet this endless quest for power is largely the result of lacking security to ensure his
own survival. The evil of man is not theological but, rather, is grounded in materia-
list competition, itself pursued due to the lack of other means to security. Hobbes
does not have a notion of sin, other than one tied to the disobedience to the covenant,
and the laws stated by the Covenant.26 He rejects a theological conception of evil
while, at the same time, attributes danger to man’s natural dispositions. Such a con-
figuration of subjectivity, therefore, conceptually enables transcendence through a
reformation of the structural conditions of the state of nature. Similarly, the other-
as-enemy is not evil, but, rather, dangerous. This distinction between danger and evil
is crucial as it explains, William E. Connoly argues, that the Hobbesian self has the
reason to recognize the need for society but does not have the nature for it. The
subject of the state of nature is in need of education and control.27
The state of nature leads man to seek survival, and in order to ensure it he may
lay down all his rights but the right to his own life. The only inalienable right, which
may not be given up to the Leviathan, is the right to life: ‘man cannot lay down the
right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he
cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himself.’28 Survival is, in this
way, connected to man’s natural right, which exists in the state of nature and
becomes the aetiology for the creation of the Leviathan. Since man has an inalien-
able right to life, it is his responsibility to himself to ensure that he does survive.
Therefore, to transcend the state of nature fulfils the responsibility one has towards
oneself to survive. Indeed, transcendence of the state of nature becomes the foremost
responsibility of the self and, as such, should not be seen merely as a pragmatic
response to danger. As Leo Strauss argues, Hobbes’s ‘contention that the State origi-
nates only in mutual fear and can only so originate had thus moral, not merely
technical, significance.’29
That survival is intimately connected to Hobbesian subjectivity becomes apparent
when, Connoly argues, the state of nature is seen as a construct aiming to express
Hobbes’s political preoccupations at the time and place of writing:
When Hobbes discusses the state of nature he is talking to people already in civil society. He
is not trying to convince them to move from a stateless condition to a state, from a condition
in which the passions are wild to one in which they are domesticated. Rather he is persuading
imperfectly domesticated subjects that they, in their present state, should consent to remain
there and should commit themselves more fully to the habits and principles that ensure the
stability of their condition, even though that condition does and must carry many
‘inconveniences’.30
Thus, Connoly suggests, the purpose of the state of nature is to simulate ‘what it
would be like to live amongst others in a condition where civil power has been
408 Louiza Odysseos
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 201.
27 Connoly, Political Theory and Modernity, p. 27.
28 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 93.
29 Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, p. 23.
30 Connoly, Political Theory and Modernity, p. 28. See also, Johann P. Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes:
Political Ideas in Historical Context (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1992).
removed’.31 In this respect, it is advisable to realize that, for Hobbes, the description
of the state of nature has an instrumental and disciplinary intent:
the state of nature is shock therapy. It helps subjects to get their priorities straight by
teaching them what life would be like without sovereignty. It domesticates by eliciting the
vicarious fear of violent death in those who have not had to confront it directly.32
Hobbesian subjectivity is shaped, therefore, by the confrontation with the
possibility of violent death. Fear of death becomes the means by which the subject,
although having no limits to his natural right, cultivates a disposition towards
survival. In this manner, with the possibility of death, the right to self-determination
and autonomy is relinquished, giving way to sovereign government: ‘when one con-
fronts the fear of early and violent death, one becomes willing to regulate oneself
and to accept external regulations that will secure life against its dangers. The fear of
death pulls the self together.’33 Transcendence of the danger that man posed to one’s
self and to others was possible because the Hobbesian self is a curious entity.
The Hobbesian individual is, first, not a given but a formation out of material that is only
partly susceptible to this form [social life] and, second, not merely an end in itself but more
significantly a means to the end of a stable society. The Hobbesian individual is thus in part a
product of the civil society which is to regulate it, and the Hobbesian problem is how to form
it so that it will be able and willing to abide by the natural laws and contracts appropriate to
civil society.34
Hobbes’s configuration of subjectivity is, therefore, well served by the accentua-
tion of man’s immature and quarrelsome sociability and his disposition to strife.
According to Connoly, this ‘is a useful passion, useful to an ordering of the self and
to peace and quiet in the social order’.35 Connoly is gesturing towards the curious
grounding of danger in human nature. The quarrelsome disposition of man is at
once a cause for concern for man’s own life and, at the same time, the means to
choosing an orderly society, that is, to ensuring that his survival is safeguarded by a
state apparatus. Thus, ‘[t]he self-interested self is an artifice, an artifice celebrated by
Hobbes as the one most conducive to a well-ordered society’.36
At the same time, however, the achievement of this ‘well-ordered society’ cannot
be taken to imply that survival ceases to be the relational schema through which
society is ordered. It is precisely for the fulfilment of the responsibility to survive
that a political order is preferred to an-archy and, therefore, instituted. In this way,
moreover, the relational schema of relating to the other as a danger to be survived
becomes embodied in a political order. What remains to be examined, however, is
how survival becomes the relational schema in the international realm, the realm left
unregulated by the commonwealth created by the social contract and to which the
article turns next.
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Interstate relations in a dangerous ontology
Once order is brought about by the covenant and safeguarded by the Leviathan,
danger is relegated to the outside of state boundaries, again in the form of others-as-
enemies. The relation between anarchy and danger in the international sphere can
be traced to the lack of principles which have brought about order inside the Levia-
than. Arche, meaning principle, dominion and order, enables us to look at an-archy
as that condition which still does not conform to the principles of a commonwealth.
Thus, danger recreates an an-archic, or unprincipled, environment reminiscent of the
pre-commonwealth state of nature, where the other-as-enemy is defined as a like-
entity, that is, as another Leviathan among many. The outside of the Leviathan
remains in the state of nature and offers no security. Beate Jahn has claimed, more-
over, that understanding ‘the international’ as a state of nature ‘is the defining claim
of IR, its very raison d’ètre’.37 Based on this logic, realism propagates the notion that
survival is the operating concept of ‘the international’. As Leo Strauss once noted in
this regard, ‘in Hobbes there is no question of a total negation of the political;
according to his doctrine, the state of nature continues at least in the relationship
between the nations’.38 James Der Derian concurs, noting that ‘Hobbes’s solution for
civil war displaces the disposition for a “warre of every man against every man” to
the international arena.’39 A parallel can be discerned where the state behaves in the
international, the outside, in the same fashion as man behaved in the state of nature.
The state acts as if it is the object and subject of its responsibility, creating what Der
Derian calls ‘an ethico-political imperative embedded in the nature of things’.40
Carl Schmitt, jurist and political thinker of the inter-war period, has offered a
systematic challenge to the proposal that anarchical relations among states can be
transcended. To this end, he reflected on the distinguishing features of ‘the political’
at the level of interstate interaction.41 Moreover, it is necessary to look at the thought
of Schmitt, for he was among the conservative thinkers who had influenced political
realists in IR, most notably, Hans Morgenthau.42 In his monograph The Concept of
the Political, Carl Schmitt provided a clear, but not ‘exhaustive’, statement of the
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distinction that characterizes ‘the political’, a distinction that had been obscured, he
believed, by the predominance of liberal thought and international practice in the
years following the First World War. According to Schmitt, ‘[t]he specific political
distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between
friend and enemy’.43
Schmitt can be seen as continuing, yet at the same time refuting, the work of
Hobbes. He refutes the Hobbesian solution to the problem of the state of nature by
reinstating the position of the political. Working in the 1920s political climate where
belief in law as the arbiter of international politics had become relatively promi-
nent,44 Schmitt wished to affirm thinking of the international realm as a state of
nature. His political theory, exemplary of which is The Concept of the Political, is
both an affirmation of Hobbes’s observations and, at the same time, a challenge to
the repercussions of the Hobbesian solution.45 Hobbes conceived of the state of
nature as a ‘state of war of all against all’. It was Schmitt’s opinion, that inter-
national politics were best understood by employing a more nuanced understanding
of the enemy, a concept which had been so broadly defined in Leviathan to enable
transcendence of the state of nature. In the Hobbesian situation of ‘war of all
against all’ every other is the enemy. ‘War of all against all’ translates otherness
into enmity in a non-discriminatory way, although, for Hobbesian political philo-
sophy, this non-discrimination was essential, if the solution of a social contract was
to succeed. In Leviathan there can exist no decision as to which otherness leads to
enmity and danger. On the contrary, the element of decision is evident only in man’s
choice to transcend his nature by agreeing ‘to lay downe a mans right to any thing’46
and to create a commonwealth ‘to conferre all their power and strength upon one
Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of
voices, unto one Will’.47 Thus, the decision in Hobbes is taken when man deems that
anarchy is the condition which leads to danger, one which can be overcome by
agreeing to a Covenant, whereby men give up their multiplicity of wills.
Schmitt, however, addressed himself to a rather different political situation to that
of Hobbes, where the authority of the Weimar Republic appeared threatened by the
belief that international law and institutions could better regulate international
political life, and where the irrevocable role of the state in the political, he felt, had
to be reasserted. For such an assertion to be effective, ‘the political’ ‘must therefore
rest on its own ultimate distinctions, to which all action with a specifically political
meaning can be traced’.48 This antithesis of friend/enemy, on which ‘the political’
rests, ‘denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an associ-
ation or disassociation’.49
This antithesis revokes the notion of transcendence by restricting the occurrence
of the state of nature to the moment when the political distinction between friend
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and enemy is made. For Schmitt, the distinction between friend and enemy is
decided only in the extreme case, that is, it is an exception rather than the norm. The
enemy is not omnipresent but can only be decided as an enemy if he poses an
existential threat. The enemy, Schmitt writes, is ‘the other, the stranger; and it is
sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something
different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible’.50
However, the enemy is not defined as every other one encounters in coexisting; on
the contrary, Schmitt’s reference to ‘enemy’ is to the public enemy, decided upon by
the state and restricted to another collectivity. ‘An enemy exists only when, at least
potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.’51 The
enemy is hostis, not inimicus, and, therefore, everyday political adversaries cannot be
‘enemies’. The political antithesis of friend/enemy is only drawn when a distinct
political entity is faced with the possibility of dying and of killing.
By allowing the political to coalesce around the extreme case, Schmitt challenged
the possibility of transcending the state of nature in international politics and,
hence, called into question the very possibility that the liberal practice of law and
the establishment of international institutions could promote peace and prevent war.
If the state of nature can be transcended then ‘the political’ is threatened.52 The
affirmation of the primacy of ‘the political’ in the extreme case eliminates, then, the
possibility of transcendence. The impossibility of transcendence is further strength-
ened by the fact that, although every distinction draws upon other distinctions
to reinforce itself, the political distinction remains autonomous. The friend/enemy
distinction may be asserted without such recourse to the moral, the aesthetic, the
economic, the religious: the state is able to distinguish who is the enemy solely by
judging whether the other ‘intends to negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore
must be repulsed’.53 Thus, ‘the political’ has an objective and autonomous nature in
the thinking of Schmitt, such that it can distinguish and act with regard to the
friend/enemy distinction without needing to refer to other antitheses, such as moral
or aesthetic considerations.
With regards to ‘morality’, moreover, ‘the political’ is conceived as the moment of
decision between friend/enemy, which is exempt from all justifications, where there is
‘justification by mere existence’.54 The existential threat of the enemy makes the
political devoid of all other concerns: ‘the political’ does not need to justify its
existence by reference to other concerns. It is justified by the mere existence of an
existential threat. The enemy raises the question of whether the collectivity, the ‘we’,
wants to take responsibility for its existence. Again, the affirmation of ‘the political’
animates and validates the responsibility to survive. It is the collectivity’s continued
survival that justifies, ‘by mere existence’, the possibility of physical killing. Once the
decision is taken, the enemy’s presence accentuates the fact that the political entity
has a responsibility to survive. Again, it must be noted that survival is not merely
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existential but ethical.55 Since this existentially threatening moment is not embodied
in an omnipresent enemy, as in Hobbes’s thought, but rather is the exception to the
rule, it cannot be transcended.
It is important, at this stage, to note briefly that in IR Schmitt’s thought has
legitimized the view that survival is an existential concern. Yet, misreading Schmitt,
political realists claimed that the existentially threatening other is that which
evacuates ‘the political’ from any need for justification. Schmitt, inadvertently, enabled
political realism to assume a stance against ‘ethics’, largely understood as morality.
In thinkers influenced by Schmitt, such as Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger,56
this presumed non-ethics became itself prescriptive in a prohibitive way: that the
enemy is not to be accorded ethical significance.57 Extrapolating further, the realist
conception became that, in international politics, ‘the ethical’ is a realm best left
alone, lest it obscure the political decision of who the enemy is in the extreme case.
Schmitt reinstated the state of nature by restricting its occurrence in the extreme
case, that is, when a collectivity is faced with an existential threat, whence springs
its responsibility to survive. For Schmitt, the autonomy of ‘the political’ is based on
the recognition of the existentially threatening enemy, which brings to the fore
the collectivity’s responsibility to survive and by recourse to which the distinction
between friend/enemy is drawn. In realism, however, the argument for the autonomy
of the political distinction is taken to prescribe that ‘the ethical’ should not be
allowed to obscure ‘the political’. In political realism, then, the autonomy of ‘the
political’, or ‘the international’, becomes divorced from its ethico-relational justifica-
tion, namely, the state’s responsibility towards the group’s survival. To reiterate,
Schmitt’s refutation of the possibility of transcendence and his reformulation that
‘the state of nature’ occurs only in an extreme case, perpetuates and refines the ethos
of survival as the mode of encountering and being with others at the interstate level.
The ethos of survival as the relationality established by the acceptance of the
dangerous ontology is discussed in greater detail below.
The ethos of survival: inside and outside
The article has, thus far, used the term ethos, tentatively defined as an attitude or
mode of relating to the other, to illuminate the operation of an ethos of survival
within the Hobbesian and Schmittian ontologies of danger. It is perhaps important
to move, at this stage, towards a more coherent and grounded formulation of ethics
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as ethos in order to be able to comment further on the possibility of ‘an ethical
international relations’. The conceptual movement from ethics, traditionally under-
stood in terms of a moral code or a set of principles for ethical action,58 to ethics
taken as a mode of relating, is achieved through a reformulation of Martin
Heidegger’s usage of ‘ethics’.59 In Letter on Humanism, Heidegger argues that ethos
means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which the human being
dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to the essence of the human being,
and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to him, to appear.60
Ethos, then, is man’s place of dwelling and enables that which is proximate to
man to reveal itself.61 The article uses this conceptual basis to reformulate ethos as
the mode, and attitude, with which man relates to what arrives and ‘resides in
nearness to him’.62 In this manner, the other, taken as the one in proximity to the self
(not to be understood in a solely geographical sense), is related to through an
attitude or mode that is affected by nearness, whether this has meant material com-
petition, competition for power, or the possibility of posing an existential threat in
the examples given above from Hobbes and Schmitt.
The preceding arguments can now be rethought on this conceptual basis, noting
that the dangerous ontology of the state of nature, where proximity to others is
theorized as a ‘warre of all against all’, determines sociality through an overriding
imperative: survival. The essence of man, according to Hobbes, is utilized to connect
danger and subjectivity and reduces, in this way, proximity to a relation of enmity. It
is only when, in contradistinction to ethics as codified morality, ethics is understood
as the mode of relating to those residing in proximity to the self, that survival is
revealed to be the predominant ethos of these Hobbesian and Schmittian ontologies.
‘Survival’, then, can be seen as a particular kind of a relational mode, whose focus is
the protection of the self and the surviving of the other. The relation to the other
becomes a relation of danger, one to be transcended in concordance with the ethical
imperative of self-preservation. As Strauss noted in this regard, ‘[s]elf-preservation
and the striving after peace for the sake of self-preservation are ‘necessary’, because
man fears death with inescapable necessity’.63
At the interstate level, Schmitt enabled a discriminatory decision towards survival,
one that rests on the extreme case of existential threat. Furthermore, the emphasis
on the distinction between friend and enemy as the moment of ‘the political’ relegates
the relational schema, through which others outside the state are encountered, to the
state’s sovereign control. The ethos of survival provides the state with the locus of
responsibility (itself, as contracted to by the state’s subjects) and allows the state to
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ignore responsibility to any external others, as this would not directly pertain to the
survival of the collectivity in question. Of significance to our thinking about ethics is
not only the fact that the other is dangerous and conceptually encountered as
an enemy. What is of greater importance, furthermore, is the linkage between
responsibility and survival, where responsible action is understood to be related to
the self ’s (be this a group or an individual) survival. Realism, grounded as it is on
the ontology of danger, employs a particular operative ‘ethical’ schema that can now
be revealed as one of survival and self-preservation. Arguably, this ethos is in
operation whenever the anarchic system is invoked.
Furthermore, it should be stated, the spacio-temporal transcendence of the state
of nature does not amount to a negation of the ethos of survival. Rather, this ethos
by which persons are related to each other in the state of nature, now becomes tran-
sposed onto the ‘inside’. The social contract assigned the management of relations
within the commonwealth to the Leviathan, which upholds the vigilant relationality
of the inside in order to ensure that an-archy does not return. Hence, the ethos of
survival is retained as the operative ethical framework of the state. The Covenant, by
which we relinquish the state of nature, transposes the relational schema of survival
to the ‘we’ or the ‘within’. Those who subscribe to the Covenant and the common-
wealth are not enemies, by virtue of the creation of the Leviathan, who ensures that
they are not. Consent to the contract is for Hobbes an ethical relation of the people
to their fellow men of ‘the inside’, an ethical relation based on the responsibility for
survival.
Acceptance of the focus on ‘survival’ as proof of the lack of ‘ethical’ concern (the
existence of an international moral code) obscures the ‘self ’-relating schema at play.
It fails, in other words, to recognize the presence of an implicit hostile relationality
to the other, where man is both the subject and object of his own responsibility. This
relationality is, what is more, transferred to the international level where states relate
as enemies in extreme cases. The article, therefore, calls for the recognition of the
ethos of survival as that mode of relating to others-as-enemies, which is operative
within the anarchic ontology of danger. As the following section discusses, this has
implications for the way international politics is conceptualized and its relation to
ethical theorizing.
From ‘ethics and IR’ to ‘an ethical international relations’
The illustration of the discursive creation of the ground of danger is not an isolated
event of textual interest to historians of ideas alone. Rather, the discursive creation
of the dangerous ontology and the perpetuation of its particular ethos can be shown
to have implications for ethical theorizing within the discipline of IR. Specifically for
the realists, and generally for those who tacitly accept/operate within an ontology of
an anarchic realm, a parallel framing of self/other as self/enemy occurs in the case of
ethics/IR. At the very least, the unchallenged acceptance of this ontology legitimates,
among realists primarily but not exclusively, the widely held belief that international
relations and ethics are considered to be distinct and separate fields of study. It
enables realist scholars to treat ethics and IR as if constituted by and operating
within a dichotomous relationship. In other words, tacit or explicit acceptance of the
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ontology of danger effects a ‘cross-roads mentality’, where IR and ethics are con-
sidered to be distinct domains of inquiry, which are brought together, and exist at
this juncture, with great difficulty.64
The tentativeness of this juncture establishes, not only the distinct nature of these
two allegedly discrete fields of inquiry but, also, the fact that international relations,
by which I mean the ‘reality’ of relations between states as actors and agents, are not
amenable to ethical thought and action. ‘Ethics’ is rendered as a domain with fixed
meanings, with a specific, knowable, and noble intent, as John D. Caputo once
remarked,65 yet one whose very concerns do not fit the ‘reality’ from which IR
theories derive and to which their prescriptive injunctions must conform. The
historical ‘colonization’ of IR by this largely realist ontology constructs it as a
discipline whose prime concern is to ensure that the state (and its represented
domestic constituency) survives in a hostile environment consisting of like-minded
actors with similar intentions and fears.
The juxtaposition of the ‘noble intent’ of ethics, understood as a moral code for
international action, and the realist ‘reminder’ as to the certain incompatibility of
their successful interaction, establishes a universalist and notably ‘liberal’ under-
standing of ethics, one that claims that states as moral agents ought to act according
to principles designed for the individual moral agent. Gordon Graham concedes that
‘[t]he importance of the idea that nations have moral rights, of which the most
important is the right to self-government, can hardly be exaggerated. It colours
almost all thinking about ethics in international affairs.’66 This fixity of the meaning
of ethics can be readily discerned from the reactions to the problematic and caution-
ary insertion of ‘ethics’ into this dangerous ontology. The mainstream, which claims
to take an explanatory, descriptive, but not prescriptive approach to relations between
states, views ethics as a restraining influence, one that demands that the (allegedly)
self-interested actions of states be subjected to a moral or ethical code of action
or behaviour. The idea that ethics is a restraining factor in the way states act, as
opposed to an enabling, motivating factor for action, is the result of the unproblem-
atized ontology of danger upon which such statements are made. This is why calls
for the resurgence of ethics in IR, or for recognition of the normative aspects of the
subject matter,67 are seen by the mainstream as a surprising and tentative event, one
that is aware of its transgression into ‘dangerous’ territory.68 Scholars wishing to
engage in ethical theorizing in IR ought to be aware, we are warned, of the harsh
terrain of the discipline’s subject matter, one not amenable to ethical restraint, and
of the danger which we may unleash by being too successful in bringing ‘ethics’ to
‘IR’.
The positing of ethics as the noble opponent of IR can be understood through
a brief reference to the often-invoked debate between communitarians and
416 Louiza Odysseos
64 This resonates with the observations Walker made about ethics and IR in Walker, Inside/Outside,
p. 50 and ch. 3 in general.
65 John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetic of Obligation with Constant Reference to
Deconstruction (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 3.
66 Gordon Graham, Ethics and International Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 5.
67 See Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), and Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches
(Hemel Hempstead, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
68 See Graham, Ethics and International Relations.
universalists,69 which frames discussions in moral philosophy and political theory,
regarding the specific grounding of morality. Universalists tend to argue for universal
codes, often based on some conception of humankind or human existence, itself the
legacy of the natural law and natural right tradition, while communitarians insist
on grounding moral codes in the particular community.70 This debate takes on a
different tone in mainstream IR which, as a discipline, has always already operated
within a particularist ethos. Any attempts to change this particularist ethical drive of
the state/community towards survival usually come from liberal universalist ethics,
which seek to establish agreed-upon universal moral code(s) for state action. Hence,
the ‘ethics and IR debate’ continuously re-enacts itself: ‘ethics’ constantly reminds
‘IR’ of the moral code, one which IR shamefully finds it cannot abide, because it
would be to its detriment to do so in the anarchic world—out there. To return to
Millennium’s editorial injunction, it can be said that the Hobbesian ethos of survival
has created, and is embodied in, the very agenda of realist IR.
Furthermore, the framing of self/other into self/enemy means that decisions that
affect the other are understood to be about the self. International action is therefore
always framed in terms of the needs or interests of the ‘self ’ and not in terms of the
other. As Connolly argues, in the ontology of danger ‘those already in civil society
[are encouraged] to treat the laws of nature as injunctions of the self ’.71 The ‘laws’ or
conceptual framework through which we relate to the other are not readily open to
interpretation. Rather, they tend to be articulated in terms of relating to the other as
an enemy. Retaining a conception of ‘ethics’ as a moral code with fixed meanings
occludes this powerful and prohibitive account of relating to others, this ethos of
survival, which permeates realist theorizing about the relations between states.
Concluding remarks
Scholars of IR interested in theorizing ‘ethical international relations’ must seek to
challenge the naturalness of the juncture of ‘ethics and international relations’.72
Below and by way of conclusion, I outline two of the repercussions of the failure to
acknowledge that the ontology of danger, and its attendant ethos, frames realist
thinking about the other(s)—out there—for specific theoretical issues, as well as
for practical purposes. First, it blinds IR theorizing to the fact that, within the
parameters of such an ontology of danger, a relational schema towards the other is
always already at play. Analyses of situations which might require action or which
might lead to inaction operate within a framework of relating, where the other is
dangerous and where ‘ethical’ action is seen as an activity with the potential
to return us to the anarchy that ‘we’ have responsibly transcended. I highlight
‘responsibly’ in an attempt to show that this ethos of survival does not only underlie
the relation to the other, but also the positing of the self as the subject and object of
responsibility.
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Second, this operating relational framework encumbers current and future
theorizing about relationality. Theorizing for an ethical international relations must
initially proceed with disclosing the ethos of survival, with understanding, in other
words, ethics as IR and IR as ethics. To move beyond this schema, or ethos, ethical
theorizing must challenge the ground on which survival becomes the prime objective
of responsibility. It must be understood, in other words, that the relational schema
of the other-as-enemy does not appear in its normative dimensions and has come to
be perceived as a pragmatic/prudent approach to world politics. The result of such a
naturalization is that IR is portrayed as a discipline where ‘ethics’ form a secondary
concern. If one wished to be concerned about ‘ethics’, then one speaks of adding the
normative back to the agenda of IR. Thus, it becomes obscured what are the ethics
of the agenda of realist IR which is, as was argued above, the agenda of survival. I
would finally suggest that this schema must be denaturalized in order to reveal, first,
that it has become prohibitive for ethical theorizing and second, to allow for the
transcendence of the dichotomous relation of ethics/IR and move us towards
‘ethical international theorizing’.
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